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COMMENT 
FAMILY TIES OR 
CRIMINAL CONTACTS: 
A CASE FOR THE APPOINTMENT 
OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL GANG 
INJUNCTION PROCEEDINGS THAT 
AFFECT FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 
INTRODUCTION 
In mid-2007 Antonio Buitrago faced a civil action that would 
prohibit him from meeting his cousin within a sixty block area of San 
Francisco. 1 This suit was not brought in response to any specific 
criminal behavior of Mr. Buitrago, nor was it brought in any criminal 
court.2 If the action was successful, however, both cousins would face 
up to six months in the county jail should they decide to have a family 
get-together within a specified public zone.3 Moreover, because this suit 
I See Complaint for Injunctive Relief Against the Norteno Criminal Street Gang, People v. 
Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007), [hereinafter "Norteno 
Complaint"]; see a/so Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Ex Parte 
Application for Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Gang Injunction, at 6, People v. Norteno, No. 
CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007) [hereinafter "Opposition to Application for 
OSC"]. 
2 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007) ("I [Antonio Buitrago] do not have a criminal 
history"). 
3 Those named as gang members are enjoined by a court order from "[s]tanding, sitting, 
walking, driving, gathering, or appearing anywhere in the public view or any place accessible by or 
41 
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was brought under civil law it was not clear whether the court would be 
required to appoint a lawyer on Mr. Buitrago's behalf.4 Thus, in mid-
2007 it appeared that Mr. Buitrago would soon be facing the bleak 
situation of self-representation before the San Francisco Superior Court 
in order to preserve his right to see his cousin in public.5 
Mr. Buitrago is a 23-year-old Latino.6 He was raised in San 
Francisco's Mission Districe with his three sisters and his cousin, 
Antonio Garcia, whom he calls "brother."g Mr. Buitrago is in a 
committed relationship of seven years and has a young daughter Alyssa.9 
Like most young parents, he hopes for a better life for his family.lo It is 
because of this hope that Mr. Buitrago has gone back to school to get his 
GED.ll Mr. Buitrago sees the Mission District as his home, so even 
though it is a tough neighborhood, he has no plans to leave. 12 The 
to the public, with any known member of the NORTENO Criminal Street Gang, excluding: I) when 
all individuals are inside a school in class or school business; and 2) when all individuals are inside a 
church." Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Gang Injunction, at 17, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 
07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007) [hereinafter "OSC"]; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 
I 66(a)4 (West 2008) ("(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), every person guilty of 
any contempt of court, of any of the following kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor: ... (4) Willful 
disobedience of the terms as written of any process or court order or out-of-state court order, 
lawfully issued by any court, including orders pending trial."); Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Application for OSC, at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
4 Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1514 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to 
counsel in a gang injunction case). 
5 See id.; Norteno Complaint. No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 
2007); 19A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 109 (2001) ("The following is a suggested admonition to a 
defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation: I. Self-representation is 
almost always unwise and the defendant may conduct a defense to his or her own detriment; 2. 
Defendant will ... get no help from the judge; 3. The prosecution will be represented by experienced 
professional counsel who will have the advantage of skill, training, education, experience and 
ability; and 4. Defendant will have no special library privileges, will receive no extra time for 
preparation and will have no staff of investigators at his or her beck and call."). 
6 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
7 The Mission District is a southern neighborhood in San Francisco that has been described 
as a "flamboyant mosaic" that boasts "the most flourishing mural scene in the country" and is home 
to "solidly working-class ... Latinos" and "radicals ... [of] failed revolutions." Gregory Dicum, 
San Francisco's Mission District: Eclectic, Eccentric, Electric, N.Y. TIMES, at 
http://travel.nytirnes.coml2005/11120/tra-vel/20next.htmINov. 20, 2005 (last visited Sept. 21,2008); 
Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 1-2, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
8 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 2, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
9 [d. at 5. 
10 [d. at 5. 
II [d. at 1-2. 
12 From 2004-2007 out of the ten districts in San Francisco the Mission District averaged the 
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Mission District is where his friends live, where he volunteers his time to 
work with local "at risk" youth, and where he partakes in community 
events like the Dia de los Muertos.1 3 
However, some of Mr. Buitrago's activities in the Mission District 
have a grittier side. He sings "gangsta' rap.,,14 He continues to associate 
with some of his childhood friends who are admitted gang members. 15 
He has declined to help officers in a gang-related investigation. 16 
Moreover, his ties with gang members are enough for a San Francisco 
police officer, Mario Molina, to declare that Mr. Buitrago is himself a 
gang member and that he goes by the gang nickname "Tone." 17 In 
support of motions by the San Francisco City Attorney, Officer Molina 
declared that, by being a gang member, Mr. Butragio contributes to the 
higher crime rate that the Mission District endures. IS Because of these 
factors, Mr. Buitrago found himself facing a civil gang injunction lawsuit 
initiated by the San Francisco City Attorney's Office. 19 
Civil gang injunctions are an attempt to combat the problem of 
gangs by prohibiting alleged gang members from engaging in specific 
activities within a specific area.20 Civil gang injunctions are empowered 
by the doctrine of public nuisance, which provides a cause of action for 
fourth highest in homicide. Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Report on Public Safety Condition 4 
(July 23, 2007); Norteno Complaint, at 3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco 
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007). The complaint alleges that the gang Norteno "dominates the 
neighborhood with verbal and physical intimidation .... " Indeed, on March 29, 2006, Mr. Buitrago 
was shot in the back by unknown assailants in his neighborhood. Opposition to Application for 
OSC, Exhibit A at 7-8, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 
2007). 
13 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 9, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492, (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
14 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 4-5, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007); Expert Declaration of SFPD Officer Molina In 
support of Ex Parte Application for Order To Show Cause Re: Preliminary Gang Injunction and 
Preliminary Gang Injunction (Part I of 2 Parts) at 35, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007) [hereinafter Expert Declaration]. 
15 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 5, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
16 Expert Declaration, at 36, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. 
Ct. June 21, 2007). 
17 Expert Declaration, at 35-36. People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco 
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, 
No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5,2007). 
18 Expert Declaration, at 1-6, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. 
Ct. June 21, 2007). 
19 Norteno Complaint, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 
June 21, 2007); Expert Declaration, at 35-36, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007). 
20 People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1120-1123 (1997); Norteno Complaint, at 
3-5, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21,2007). 
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an unreasonable and substantial interference with a right common to the 
general pUblic.2l Under a civil gang injunction, certain activities of the 
named individuals are declared a public nuisance because of their alleged 
gang involvement.22 The individuals named in the suit are then barred 
from the activities that enable the gang to function and thereby cause a 
nuisance.23 Many of these prohibited activities are already illega1.24 For 
instance, the gang injunction that Mr. Buitrago faced would forbid him 
from committing such crimes as trespassing or selling, possessing, or 
manufacturing a controlled substance.25 However, the injunction would 
also forbid Mr. Buitrago from many lawful activities, such as wearing 
red clothing, being out in public between ten o'clock in the evening and 
sunrise, and associating with any other alleged gang member.26 
One controversial aspect of these suits is that they attempt to 
combat a criminal problem through the civil arena.27 A defendant in a 
criminal action is entitled to far more safeguards than a defendant in a 
civil action.28 In particular, the right to counsel in criminal cases is 
21 Restatement (Second) Torts § 8218 (1979); see also CAL. CIV. CODE 3480 (West 2008) 
("A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or 
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon 
individuals may be unequal."); cf People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1102-1106 
(1997). 
22 Norteno Complaint, at 2-3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. 
Ct. June 21, 2007). 
23 Flahive v. City of Dana Point, 72 Cal. App. 4th 241, 244, 245 n.5 (Ct. App. 1999) 
("[California] Civil Code section 3491 provides three remedies for a public nuisance: (I) a criminal 
proceeding; (2) a civil action; or (3) abatement .... In its purest sense "abatement" is the act of 
eliminating the condition that causes the nuisance."). 
24 Norteno Complaint, at 15, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. 
Ct. June 21, 2007) (praying for "an Order enjoining and restraining NORTENO and its members, 
associates, affiliates, recruits, and anyone else acting on its behalf, from committing crimes ... and 
any other conduct amounting to a nuisance .... "). 
25 Norteno Complaint, at 16, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. 
Ct. June 21, 2007). 
26 1d. at 16-17. 
27 1d. at 16-18. 
28 See People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1253-57 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding there 
is no right to a jury trial in a civil gang injunction action, and the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence is used in the determination of such actions); see also Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 
App. 4th 1500, 1514 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to counsel in a civil gang injunction action). 
In contrast, for the standards used in criminal cases, see U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In criminal 
pr~secutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [to a trial] by an impartial jury."); Clark v. Ariz., 548 
U.S. 735, 738 (2006) ("a defendant is innocent unless and until the government proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of the offense charged"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-
44 (1963) (finding a right to counsel in criminal actions). The California courts have expressed 
concern in situations where "the membrane separating civil issues from criminal charges ... is 
especially thin." Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 65 (Ct. App. 1980). 
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guaranteed to a defendant,29 whereas in civil cases, one is provided with 
counsel only in special circumstances.3o Moreover, a California 
appellate decision, Iraheta v. Superior Court, held that civil gang 
injunctions were not the kind of civil case that warranted the 
appointment of counse1.31 Specifically, the court in Iraheta determined 
that "[t]o expand the due process right of legal counsel to the alleged 
gang members in this case would be unprecedented, and would result in 
the expansion of the right to counsel to a number of other civil actions. ,,32 
Thus, if individuals are targeted by a civil gang injunction, and cannot 
afford lawyers, they must represent themselves in their own defense 
against government-employed attorneys or face a default judgment. 
Mr. Buitrago's situation is particularly unusual because the 
injunction he faced infringed upon a fundamentally intimate sphere: his 
family?3 Specifically, the injunction Mr. Buitrago faced alleged that 
both he and his cousin, Antonio Garcia, were gang members and 
therefore sought to enjoin them from meeting together in pUblic.34 Thus, 
in mid-2007 Mr. Buitrago found himself facing the prospect of litigation 
that would have barred him from meeting his cousin in public, without 
the benefit of an attorney.35 Under the terms of the injunction, if Mr. 
Butragio were to leave from school, cross the street into 'his 
neighborhood, and see his cousin, he would have to cross back over to 
the other side of the street, or pass by his cousin and act as though they 
were strangers.36 If Mr. Buitrago were to stop and talk to his cousin in 
29 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963) (fmding a right to counsel in criminal 
actions). 
30 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs .. 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (l98\); White v. Bd. of Med. Quality 
Assurance, 128 Cal. App. 3d 699,707 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the general rule is that there is 
no due process right to counsel in civil cases). 
31 Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1515 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to 
counsel in a civil gang injunction action). 
32 Id. 
33 Expert Declaration, at 35, 49, People v. Norteno. No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco 
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to Application for OSC, at 8-9, People v. Norteno. No. CGC 
07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
34 Expert Declaration, at 35, 49, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco 
Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to Application for OSC, at 8-9, People v. Norteno. No. CGC 
07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
35 Those enjoined under the injunction are prohibited from "standing sitting walking driving 
gathering or appearing in public." Norteno Complaint, at 17, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007). 
36 The Precita center where Mr. Buitrago is taking classes is located at 534 Precita Avenue, 
which is on the border of the injunction zone and his home neighborhood. See Norteno Complaint, at 
2, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007); Opposition to 
Application for OSC at 15, Exhibit A at 3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco 
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
5
Jones: Counsel in Civil Gang Injunctions
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
46 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
public, he could be prosecuted and end up spending up to six months in 
county jail.37 
This comment argues that when an individual is targeted by a civil 
gang injunction that interferes with that individual's family relationships, 
due process requires the appointment of counsel for that individual.38 
This comment does not argue that civil gang injunctions should be 
prohibited, or even that civil gang injunctions should not be able to 
enjoin family members from seeing each other in pUblic.39 Part I 
discusses the problem of gangs and how civil gang injunctions have 
emerged to combat them. Part II explores factors considered for the 
appointment of counsel in civil cases and why family relationships put a 
personal interest at stake that warrants such appointment. Finally, Part 
III explores how the government's interests and the risk of erroneous 
decisions in civil gang injunction proceedings that interfere with family 
relationships further warrant the appointment of counsel. 
I. THE RISE OF THE CIVIL GANG INJUNCTION 
In order to gain a nuanced understanding of civil gang injunctions 
and to discuss them effectively, it is important to first understand how 
and why they arose. The proposition that gangs are a serious problem is 
37 CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (West 2008) ("(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), and 
(d), every person guilty of any contempt of court, of any of the following kinds, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor: ... (4) Willful disobedience of the terms as written of any process or court order or 
out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by any court, including orders pending triaL"); Opposition to 
Application for OSC, at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 
5,2007). 
38 The basic argument functions by assembling three guidelines. First, "[t]he essence of due 
process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (quoting 
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.s. 123, 171-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Second, "recent jurisprudence restricts the reach of the protections of substantive due process 
primarily to liberties 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'" Armendariz v. Penman. 
75 F.3d 1311,1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977». Third, "the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history." Moore v. 
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
39 There is already a wealth of law review articles on the constitutional validity and 
desirability of civil gang injunctions. Arguments in support of gang injunctions are described in the 
following: Gregory Walston, Taking the Constitution at it's Word: A Defense of the Use of Anti-
Gang injunctions, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 47 (1999); Bergen Herd, injunctions as a Tool to Fight 
Gang-Related Problems in California After People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution? 28 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 629 (1998). Arguments against gang injunctions are described in the 
following: Joan Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice Critique of 
Anti-Gang Public Nuisance injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717 (2000); Matthew Werdeger, 
Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement injunctions Against Urban Street 
Gangs. 51 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1999). This article also does not address the proper standard a court 
should employ in deciding whether to issue a gang injunction. 
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not a controversial one.40 A ten-year study by the Institute for 
Intergovernmental Research revealed that from 1996 to 2006 the total 
number of gangs in the United States averaged around 25,000.41 
Regardless of whether gang violence is a symptom or root cause of a 
larger social issue, most can agree that in light of such statistics gang 
violence serves as a blight upon communities and that their harmful 
activities should be stopped.42 Enter the power of injunction. 
An injunction is a judicial order requiring a person to do or refrain 
from doing certain acts.43 In this capacity injunctions have served as an 
age-old remedy to solve state problems.44 However, the use of 
injunctions against gang violence is fairly recent, occurring first in 1981 
in Los Angeles,45 and not corning into widespread use until the early 
1990s.46 Since then, despite inconclusive and contradictory reports,47 
civil gang injunctions have gained popularity and are now regularly used 
40 Even the ACLU, which has stated that civil gang injunctions are "futile" and based on a 
"false premise," admits that a successful curtailment of gangs would "markedly enhance the safety 
and security of the innocent public." ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FALSE 
PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: THE BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, at 44 
(1997). 
41 National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, Measuring the Extent of Gang Problems, available 
at http://www.iir.comlnygc/nygsa/measurin~the_extenCoCgan~problems.htm (last visited Apr. 
13,2008). 
42 ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FALSE PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: THE 
BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH, at 44 (1997). 
43 43A C.J.S. Injunction § I (2008). 
44 In the early eighteenth century, public nuisance law actually became a catch-all criminal 
action and was defined as "an offense against the public, either by doing a thing which tends to the 
annoyance of all the King's subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the common good 
requires." EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 54 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004); Also, there is an American 
tradition of using nuisance as a catch-all to solve state problems. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 
(1895) (utilizing the doctrine of public nuisance to stop unions in their efforts during the Pullman car 
strikes). 
45 Matthew Werdeger, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nuisance Abatement 
Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs. 51 STAN. L. REv. 409, 414 (1999). 
46 EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 65-66 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004). 
47 The studies of effectiveness range from positive, to negative, to inconclusive. See Cheryl 
L. Maxson, It's Getting Crazy Out There: Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community? 4 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'y 577 (2005) (finding mixed results on the effectiveness of civil gang 
injunctions); ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FALSE PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: 
THE BLYTHE STREET GANG INJUNCTION AND ITS AFTERMATH (1997) (finding that civil gang 
injunctions are ineffective); The Effects of Civil Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent Crime: 
Evidence from Los Angeles County, 45 J.L. & ECON. 60 (2002) (finding a 5%-10% decrease in 
violent crime the first year after an injunction is imposed); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GANG WARS: 
THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT TACTICS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY 
STRATEGIES (2007) (reporting that despite widespread use of gang injunctions, Los Angeles remains 
the gang capital of the world). 
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throughout California.48 This proliferation of civil gang lllJunction 
litigation has been enabled through the tacit approval of the California 
Supreme Court in its 1997 decision People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna.49 In 
Acuna the court determined that gang members could be enjoined from 
meeting in public because their presence together constituted a public 
nuisance.5o In so ruling, the court rejected a host of constitutional 
arguments, including alleged violations of the right to assembly, the right 
to free speech, and the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.51 
The Acuna decision begins with a recounting of the horrific 
activities of the VST gang in the town of Rocksprings. 52 Due to gang 
activity, the residents of Rocksprings had their garages used as urinals, 
and their front lawns as drug bazaars. 53 Trapped within their homes, the 
residents of Rocksprings could do little more than stand by as murder, 
vandalism and theft became commonplace neighborhood events.54 In 
describing these activities, the court paints a picture of an "urban war 
zone" where the members of the "community are prisoners in their own 
homes.,,55 In such a situation the demand to stop such gang activities 
flows quite naturally from a desire to assure ordinary citizens "[t]he 
freedom to leave one's house and move about at will, and to have a 
measure of personal security.,,56 Moreover, because the doctrine of 
public nuisance was such a well-established legal principle, its use to 
48 EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 54 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004) (Appendix A lists 41 such 
injunctions issued between 1992 and 2001). Also, some of the California Civil Code now is built 
around abating criminal action through the device of nuisance. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 11570 (West 2008) ("Every building or place used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, 
serving, storing, keeping, manufacturing, or giving away any controlled substance... is a 
nuisance .... "). 
49 People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1125 (1997). 
50 Id. 
5! Id. at 1110-20. 
52 Id. at 1100. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1125; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 98,115 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (finding anti-gang loitering ordinance is not void for vagueness). The dissenters Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas predicated parts of their opinions to find the anti-gang loitering statute 
constitutional upon their outrage towards atrocious gang activities, stating that "[t]he human costs 
exacted by criminal street gangs are inestimable." Id at 98. Or "the people who will suffer from our 
lofty pronouncements [which strikes down the gang loitering ordinance] are people like Ms. Susan 
Mary Jackson; people who have seen their neighborhoods literally destroyed by gangs and violence 
and drugs. They are good decent people who must struggle to overcome their desperate situation, 
against all odds, in order to raise their families, earn a living, and remain good citizens." Id. at 115. 
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empower a civil gang injunction seemed relatively uncontroversia1.57 
Few states, however, have contemplated using the doctrine of public 
nuisance to combat crime, and fewer still have actually used it.58 In City 
of New York v. Andrews, a New York court considered an action similar 
to a civil gang injunction against a pimp and prostitution ring.59 New 
York City sought to ban the ring's participants from public view within 
the Queens Plaza area between the hours of eleven o'clock in the evening 
and seven o'clock in the moming.6o The New York court refused to 
issue the injunction partly on the grounds that it was an inappropriate use 
of civil authority and that the "prosecution of criminal matters should be 
57 See Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1102-06. 
58 EDWARD ALLEN, CIVIL GANG ABATEMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
POLICING BY INJUNCTION 249 (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC 2004). Attempts to obtain gang 
injunctions in New York City and Phoenix, Arizona, have been denied. As of 2004 the only 
successful gang injunction outside of California has occurred in Austin and San Antonio, Texas. 
This is not to say that states outside California have sought civil recourse against gangs. In fact, 
much harsher civil solutions than civil gang injunctions have been devised and implemented. The 
Chicago suburb of Cicero, for instance, passed a gang banishment ordinance, under which those 
identified as gang members and determined to be a threat to the community were required to leave 
town and never return, or else face a $500-a-day fine. Ordinance Providing for the Enforcement of 
Gang Free Zones in the Town of Cicero, Ordinance No 111-99 (April 1999), amending Cicero Code 
of Ordinances ch. 35. For extensive and thorough commentary on this particular case, see Stephanie 
Smith, Civil Banishment Of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements? 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (2000). 
59 City of New York v. Andrews, 719 N.Y.S.2d 442,536-538 (Sup. Ct. 2000). 
60 Id. at 44 7. The complete list of relief sought included a prohibition of: 
A. Standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view; B. 
Loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense, as defined by New York 
Penal Law Section 240.37; C. Committing an act of prostitution and/or promoting 
prostitution as defined by Penal Law Sections 230.00, and 230.15 et seq.; D. Collecting, 
receiving, soliciting money, drugs or any other thing of value for prostitution services 
rendered or to be rendered; E. Possessing any weapons including, but not limited to, knives, 
box cutters, razors, concealed or loaded firearms, and any other illegal weapon as defined in 
the New York State Penal Law, and any other object capable of inflicting serious bodily 
injury; F. Blocking free access to the public sidewalks, streets and the areas surrounding the 
Subject Neighborhood; G. Approaching individuals or confronting, intimidating, annoying, 
harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting or doing anything to obstruct or 
delay the free flow of pedestrian traffic; H. Approaching individuals or confronting, 
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting or doing 
anything to obstruct or delay the free flow of vehicular traffic; I. Littering or causing others 
to litter condoms and condom wrappers in the streets and sidewalks; J. Urinating in the 
streets, on the sidewalks, in alleyways, or anywhere in public view; K. Trespassing or 
encouraging others to trespass on any private property; L. In any manner confronting, 
intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or 
battering any residents, patrons or person or persons who have provided information in 
support of this Complaint and in Support for Plaintiff's request for a Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
Id. at 477 n.2. 
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left to criminal courtS.,,61 The Acuna court, by contrast, was not 
concerned with this distinction: "whether [the nuisance caused] be a 
criminal nuisance or not is wholly imrnaterial.,,62 However, by failing to 
carefully examine the criminal/civil distinction, the courts have left 
defendants facing civil gang injunctions in one of the gray areas of due 
process: the appointment of counsel in civil cases.63 
II. WHEN THE RIGHT TO COURT-APPPOINTED COUNSEL ATTACHES IN 
CIVIL CASES 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainright 
guaranteed the right to counsel in criminal cases under the Sixth 
Amendment.64 The right to counsel in civil cases, however, is not based 
on the Sixth Amendment, but rather upon the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires court-appointed counsel only in 
select situations.65 The recognition of the right to counsel in civil cases 
originated in Mathews v. Eldridge, where the Supreme Court found that 
"[ d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.,,66 To this end, the Court held that the 
identification of the specific dictates of due process required the 
consideration of three factors: 1) the private interests at stake, 2) the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation, and 3) the government's interest involved.67 
This general test was refined in Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services to specifically evaluate at which times due process requires the 
appointment of counsel in a civil case.68 The Lassiter test first asks if 
there is a presumption against the right to counsel.69 Such a presumption 
61 Id. at 455. 
62 Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at 1108. 
63 As late as 200 I, a California appellate court indicated in dictum that "the Constitutional 
right to counsel in civil cases is evolving." In re Angel, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1074, 1080 (Ct. App. 
2001). Other California courts have also expressed concern in situations where "the membrane 
separating civil issues from criminal charges ... is especially thin." Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 
Cal. App. 3d 57, 65 (et. App. 1980). Civil gang injunctions and the right to counsel are precisely 
such a scenario. 
64 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-345 (1963). 
65 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs, 452 U.S. 18, 26-28 (1981) (finding no due process 
requirement for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in a proceeding for the termination 
of parental status). 
66 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
67 Id. at 334-35. 
68 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32. It is interesting to note that the Court observed that even 
though there was no due process requirement, "[aj wise public policy, however, may require that 
higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution." Id. at 33. 
69Id.at31. 
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is imposed so long as the action does not threaten to result in a 
"deprivation of physicalliberty.,,7o The next step involves weighing the 
presumption, if it exists, against the three Eldridge factors. 71 Thus, under 
Lassiter, in order to determine if there is a right to counsel in a civil 
proceeding, the court must first determine whether a presumption against 
the right to counsel exists, and, if such a presumption does exist, then the 
court must measure the net weight of the Eldridge factors against the 
presumption.72 
Using these basic guidelines, the California courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court have acknowledged the right to counsel in a variety of 
civil situations, including child custody proceedings/3 child dependency 
proceedings,74 juvenile commitment hearings,75 parole revocation 
proceedings/6 and contempt-of-court cases.77 California courts have 
also expressly declined to recognize a right to counsel in other civil 
situations, such as civil forfeiture proceedings78 and civil gang 
70 Id. at 30. "Physical liberty" as used in Lassiter seems to encompass direct incarceration, 
no matter how "brief." Id. In contrast, the term "physical liberty," in the modern case law, seems to 
have gained a much broader meaning. For example, the test to show a deprivation of physical 
liberty has been phrased as a requirement that "petitioners ... establish that [the] civil proceedings 
may deprive them of an interest that is as fundamental as a right to physical liberty or as paramount 
as the right to care, custody and management of one's child." Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 
App.4th 1500, 1509 (Cl. App. 1999). 
71 "We must balance these [Eldridge] elements against each other, and then set their net 
weight in the scales against the presumption." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
72 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1505 ("The court must balance the 'net weight' of the three 
Eldridge factors 'against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the 
indigent, ifhe is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom."') (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27). 
73 In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 265 (Cl. App. 1983) (finding a right to counsel because 
severance of the parent-child relationship amounts to a taking ofliberty). 
74 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 33 (1979) (finding a right to counsel in a paternity hearing 
because "the state has no legitimate interest incorrectly ascribing parentage and imposing the 
obligations of fatherhood on someone other than the child's actual father. Appointment of counsel 
for indigent defendants will make the fact-finding process in paternity cases more accurate, thereby 
furthering the state's legitimate interests in securing support for dependent children."). 
75 Application of Gault, 387 U.S. I, 39 (1967) (finding that a juvenile who faces charges of 
delinquency has a right to counsel because the juvenile's right to freedom and the parent's right to 
custody are at stake). 
76 Gagon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (finding the right to counsel in parole 
revocation proceedings on a case by case basis). 
77 County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1686, 1697 (Cl. App. 1992) 
(finding that to hold an indigent defendant in contempt for failing to pay child support was criminal 
in nature and required the appointment of counsel). 
78 People v. $30,000 U.S. Currency, 35 Cal. App. 4th 936, 944 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding no 
right to appointed counsel because, among other factors, defendant did not face incarceration). But 
see State v. $1,010.00 in Am. Currency, 722 N.W. 2d 92, 99 (S.D. 2006) (finding a right to counsel 
because petitioner faced the loss of an important property interest). 
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injunctions.79 Specifically, the California case Iraheta v. Superior Court 
detennined that there is generally no right to court-appointed counsel in a 
civil gang injunction action.80 
A. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES 
In determining whether the right to counsel attaches in the civil 
context, it is necessary to first detennine whether the Lassiter 
presumption against counsel exists for that particular kind of civil 
proceeding. The Lassiter presumption against counsel exists so long as 
the impending action does not threaten to deprive one of "physical 
liberty.,,81 Unfortunately, the court in Lassiter never explicitly defined 
what constitutes a "deprivation of physicalliberty.,,82 Nevertheless, it is 
settled that a proceeding that directly imposes a danger of imprisonment 
or institutionalization upon an individual counts as a deprivation of 
physical liberty.83 The Iraheta court noted that criminal proceedings, 
and thus incarceration, are merely a future possibility for those who are 
targeted by a civil gang injunction.84 That is, before an individual faces 
incarceration via a civil gang injunction, he or she must first litigate the 
civil gang injunction action, lose, violate the injunction, and then have a 
79 Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1514-1515 (Ct. App. 1999). 
80 1d. 
81 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,31 (1981). 
82 Michael Milleman, The State of Due Process Justification For a Right to Counsel in Some 
Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733 (2006) (recognizing that the Court only left 
"cryptic clues" about the showing necessary to overcome the preumption). 
83 Scott v. Il1inois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (stating that the premise that "actual 
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment ... is 
eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional 
right to appointment of counsel"); People v. $30,000 U.S. Currency, 35 Cal. App. 4th 936, 944 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (finding no right to counsel because "[u]nlike the situation in Salas, in which the 
defendant faced incarceration and other serious consequences from an adverse judgment, here, 
defendant's interest also is merely financial."); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315-316 (1993) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own 
behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty ... [is 
a] 'deprivation ofliberty"') (citations omitted). 
84 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1510 ("The possibility that [the] defendant [in Salas] would 
suffer the loss of his physical liberty, while a factor, was not a determinative factor."). The severity 
of liability inherent in violating a civil gang injunction did not seem to be fully appreciated in the 
Iraheta court's opinion. As noted by Matthew Werdegar in Enjoining the Constitution, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 409, 437 (1999), examples of incarceration following a gang injunction can be seen where a "a 
16-year-old youth banned in a gang injunction [in] Oceanside, California, was sentenced to 240 days 
in a juvenile detention camp for publicly associating with another defendant." But cf Application of 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1,61 (1967) (finding a right to counsel in a civil proceeding where petitioner was 
facing six years of confinement in lieu ofa $50-$100 fine). 
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criminal action brought under section 166 of the California Penal Code.85 
The Iraheta court then noted that inherent but not immediate danger of 
criminal liability also existed in Lassiter, and yet, the U.S. Supreme 
Court determined that there was a presumption against counsel. 86 Thus, 
in light of the Lassiter court's treatment of future incarceration, the 
Iraheta court concluded that the future possibility of criminal action was 
not enough to dispel the Lassiter presumption.87 
The additional consideration of family members being enjoined 
does not change this analysis. In particular, the fact that family members 
are being enjoined from meeting in public does not bring the immediacy 
of imprisonment or institutionalization any closer upon a defendant than 
it would otherwise.88 Thus, even considering family interference, there is 
probably a presumption against counsel in civil gang injunction cases.89 
B. INTERFERENCE WITH THE F AMIL Y AND OVERCOMING THE 
PRESUMPTION AGAINST COUNSEL 
After determining that there is a presumption against counsel, the 
85 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509-11. 
86 1d. at 1511 n.4. 
87 "The possibility that [the 1 defendant [in Salas 1 would suffer the loss of his physical liberty, 
while a factor, was not a determinative factor." Id. at 1510. 
88 There is an argument to be made that one may become a sort of virtual prisoner in public 
by enduring the humiliation of not being able to meet his or her family members as they choose. A 
broad reading of cases like Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 502 (1977) (finding a 
due process violation when the government seeks to interfere with the family through a housing 
ordinance) could yield the argument that because a due process violation means there has been a 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property a due process violation means that there is a per se 
"deprivation of a personal liberty." Although I sympathize with this argument, it is somewhat 
attenuated; the legal term "deprivation of personal liberty" is unique and is very rarely used by the 
U.S. and California Supreme Courts. Because of this limited use, it is likely that the term has some 
special meaning apart (although not discontinuous) from liberty as associated with due process 
generally. 
89 In the context of the right to counsel in civil cases, it should be noted that it is unclear if 
the California Supreme Court has found broader authority under the California Constitution that 
does not impose a presumption against counsel. Petition for Review at 9, Iraheta v. Superior Court, 
70 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999) (No. S078658); People v. lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1507 (1999) 
("Petitioners urge this court to disregard the general rule and thus to ignore the second prong of the 
Lassiter test"). For example, the California Supreme Court, referring to the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Scott v. I/linois, a case that did not find for the appointment of counsel, explained "Scott 
is not the law in California." Salas v. Cortez, 24 Ca1.3d 22, 27 n.2 (1979); Petition for Review at 9, 
Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999). Also, the later case ofln re Jay R. finds for the right 
to counsel in a paternity hearing very similar to the situation in Lassiter where the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not find such a right. In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 265 (Ct. App. 1983). Whether or 
not the California courts have distinguished their state constitutional due process requirements from 
the U.S. Constitution, the nature of the rights involved in civil gang injunctions that interfere with 
familial relationships is such that the right to counsel should be required. 
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Iraheta court then held that in order to outweigh the Lassiter 
presumption, "petitioners must establish that these civil proceedings may 
deprive them of an interest that is as fundamental as a right to physical 
liberty or as paramount as the right to the care, custody and management 
of one's child.,,90 This is where a civil gang injunction's interference 
with the family takes on its significance. If it can be established that 
interference with family relationships deprives one of a personal interest 
that is as fundamental as the care and custody of one's child, then the 
presumption could be overcome.91 
Regarding the first Eldridge factor - the private interests at stake -
the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process invariably become implicated in the 
context of government interference with family relationships.92 
Unfortunately, for purposes of measuring the personal liberty at stake, 
the lraheta court refused to recognize that any First Amendment rights 
were being threatened because of the California Supreme Court's 
holding in Acuna.93 The Acuna court held that if a group targeted by a 
civil gang injunction does not exist as an "intimate" or "instrumental" 
organization, then First Amendment protections do not apply.94 The 
defendant in Acuna did not meet this standard because protection under 
"the First Amendment, 'does not extend to joining with others for the 
purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights. ",95 Thus under 
Acuna a civil gang injunction does not infringe upon any First 
Amendment rights.96 
One problem with this approach is that under the Eldridge test, the 
private interests at stake are the "potential" injuries a defendant faces. 97 
90lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509; see also County of Orange v. Dabs, 29 Cal. App. 4th 
999, 1004 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding a right to counsel for defendant "[ e )ven if he cannot be jailed ."). 
91 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509. 
92 "The Supreme Court has found that the Constitution protects the family in general." 
Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 1196 (1993); 
see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (" ... the Bill of rights is 
designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds 
of highly personal relationships ... relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional 
protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage."). 
93 lraheta, Cal. App. 4th at 1511. 
94 People ex rei. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1110-12 (1997). 
95 1d. at 1112. (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).) 
96 1d. ("[T)he fact that defendants may 'exercise some discrimination in choosing associates 
[by a) selective process of inclusion and exclusion' does not mean that the association or its 
activities in Rocksprings is one that commands protection under the First Amendment." (emphasis 
added) (quoting N.Y. State Club Assn. v. N.Y. City 487 U.S. I, 13 (1988)). 
97 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319,340 (1976). 
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While the Acuna court may have ruled that the right to assembly has no 
meaning with regard to gang members who gather to deprive "third 
parties of their lawful rights," it is possible to imagine situations where 
some of the individuals targeted by a civil gang injunction do share a 
protected relationship.98 The case of family members being enjoined 
from meeting in public presents such a scenario.99 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[f]amily relationships, by 
their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a 
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one's life."loo Because of this special 
relationship the Supreme Court has determined that "relationships with 
these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have 
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element 
of personal liberty."lol Thus, because family relationships are properly 
defined as "intimate," they are properly entitled to First Amendment 
protection of association. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not stopped at the First Amendment 
and has gone on to recognize that the Constitution also provides the 
family protections from governmental interference under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 For example, in Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, the Supreme Court found that an ordinance 
prohibiting a grandmother and her two grandsons, who were first 
cousins, from living together was unconstitutional. 103 Specifically, the 
court found that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment."lo4 Thus, based upon Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland and similar holdings, the Constitution provides general 
protection when the government attempts to interfere with the family.lo5 
98 Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th at1112; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
99Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1509 (\ 999) ("[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment protects against a State's interferences with ... family relationships ... as well as with 
an individual's bodily integrity.") (quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 
1996).); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20 "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's 
interferences with personal decisions relating to ... family relationships."). 
100 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984). 
101 Id. at 620. 
102 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619-620; Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 503, (\ 977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (\974). 
103 Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
104 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-500. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 
639-640 (\ 974).) The court in Moore also found that the ordinance in question had a "tenuous 
relation to [the] alleviation" of the overcrowding at which the ordinance was aimed. 
105 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-40; Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
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Therefore, not only is association with the family properly defined 
as intimate and protected by the First Amendment,106 but the family also 
enjoys additional substantive rights under the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 107 Because the Constitution provides these two 
deeply rooted substantive rights to the family,108 consideration of them 
should be more important when courts evaluate the private interests at 
stake with the Eldridge test. 109 Thus, the procedural protection of court-
appointed counsel is necessary to assure that these substantive rights are 
appropriately honored. I 10 
Moreover, it should also be noted that injunctions, such as those 
against Mr. Iraheta and Mr. Buitrago, prove that the possibility of family 
members being prohibited from meeting in public as they choose is not 
merely an academic exercise. In 1999 Mr. Iraheta was enjoined from 
meeting with his twin brother within a specified zone, and in 2007 Mr. 
Buitrago faced a suit to prevent him from meeting with his cousin in his 
home neighborhood. III 
C. F AMIL Y RELATIONSHIPS AS ENTITLED TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION 
Recognizing that family relationships are entitled to additional 
safeguards naturally raises the question: what kinds of relationships are 
encompassed by the term "family"? Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
has found general rights for the family under the Constitution, it has not 
addressed whether such fundamental rights extend to specific family 
relationships such as those between siblings or cousins. I 12 However, in 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 632. 
106 Roberts, 468 u.s. at 619-20. 
107 Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99. 
108 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects die sanctity 
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition"). 
109 See lraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1509 (1999). 
110 See 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 8 (West 2008). As a general proposition the 
rules of civil procedure exist to afford individuals a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
actions. Since "our adversary system presupposes, accurate and just results are most likely to be 
obtained through the equal contest of opposed interest" protecting substantive rights with court 
appointed counsel will assure that a "just" result is reached. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18,28 (1981). 
III Petition for Review, at 14, Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500 (1999); Expert 
Declaration, at 49, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 
2007). 
112 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 
1195 (1993). ("Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of siblings' 
rights to maintain contact with each other, it has addressed issues relating to the fundamental rights 
16
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Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the Court applied a test to 
detennine what constitutes a family relationship.113 In Smith three 
factors were considered to determine whether a family relationship 
existed: 1) the existence of a biological relationship, 2) the existence of 
emotional attachments, and 3) whether the relationship exists apart from 
the power of the state. I 14 Thus, whether two siblings or cousins are 
"family," and are entitled to generally recognized rights as a family, 
seems simple enough under the Smith test. IIS 
Siblings and cousins are very often linked both biologically and 
emotionally and these links are usually created without the benefit of the 
state. When examining relationships where the biological link between 
two family members is more attenuated, such as that between cousins, an 
examination of the emotional attachments between the family members 
can alleviate concerns that the assignment of constitutional protection is 
contrived. For instance, in the case of Mr. Buitrago and his cousin, facts 
that the two refer to one another as "brother" and that they share the 
interrelated nicknames of "Fat Tone" and "Little Tone" demonstrate the 
existence of close emotional attachments creating an authentic family 
relationship.116 Thus, the detennination of whether siblings or cousins 
may properly be considered family as defined by Smith is a factual 
question to be detennined on a case-by-case basis. 117 
In interpreting these U.S. Supreme Court cases, some lower federal 
courts have explicitly granted constitutional protections to relationships 
like those shared by siblings. 118 In contrast, at least one lower federal 
court has declined to extend such protections. I 19 Much like the lower 
of the family. The Supreme Court has found that the Constitution protects the family in general ... 
. "). 
113 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187, 
1195 (1993); see Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47 
(1977). 
114 Smith, 431 U.S. at 843-46 (1977). 
115 Barbara Jones Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1187, 
1208 (1993). 
116 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 2, People V. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492, (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
117 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1187 
(1993). 
118 See, e.g., Aristotle P. V. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, lOll (N.D. Ill. 1989) (denying 
defendants' motion to dismiss in light of the growing body of decisional law articulating the 
associational rights of siblings); see also County of Fulton V. Whalen, No. 94-540, 1994 WL 
16100063 (U.S. Nov. 23,1994). 
119 Russ V. Watts, 414 FJd 783,790 (7th Cir. 2005)(finding that the governmental action was 
not purposeful); see also B.H. y. Johnson, 715 F. Supp 1387, 1399-1400 (N.D. I111989) (finding that 
after children had been legally and legitimately separated there was no due process right to 
visitation). These cases can be read as building upon the U.S. Supreme Court's statement that 
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federal courts, state courts are split on whether to acknowledge the rights 
of siblings. 12o 
In California rights between siblings have been established but are 
not all-encompassing. 121 Much of the advances of sibling associational 
rights have occurred in the context of child custody proceedings where 
children face being split Up.122 Under California statutory law, child 
custody proceedings are determined in accordance with the "best 
interest" of the child. 123 Thus, in such proceedings the associational 
rights of the children are considered under a statutory mandate to achieve 
this end, and the greater constitutional issues involved are rarely 
addressed directly. 124 
This reluctance to address the constitutional issues probably stems 
from the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate to avoid constitutional issues 
and a fear of conflicting constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated that lower courts should "avoid constitutional issues when 
resolution of such issues is not necessary for [the] disposition of a 
"[h]istorically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government 
officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property" rather than being applied to decisions 
denying the associational rights of siblings. Daniels v. WiIliams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (\986). Here, 
because civil gang injunctions that affect family relationships are an intentional state action which 
interferes with the family, such a predication would be difficult to make. But see Ken R. v. Arthur 
Z., 682 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 1996) (finding no constitutional right for siblings to associate 
generally). 
120 Compare Lv. G., 497 A.2d 215, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (adult sibling had 
right to visit with minor sibling over objections of father and stepmother) with Ken R. v. Arthur Z., 
682 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 1996) (although recognizing the "well established" importance ofa sibling 
relationship which creates an interest greater than the average citizenry, finding no constitutional 
right). 
121 See In re Marriage ofWiIliams, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808, 814 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that 
"[c]hildren are not community property to be divided equally for the benefit of their parents .. , [a]t 
a minimum, the children have a right to the society and companionship of their siblings."). But see 
In re Gerald 1., I Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1187 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that "the juvenile court law 
expresses no affirmative duty to keep siblings together."). 
122 In re Marriage of Williams, 88 Cal. App. 4th 808,814 (Ct. App. 2001). 
123 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3120 (West 2004) ("[T]he husband or wife may bring an action for the 
exclusive custody of the children of the marriage. The court may, during the pendency of the action, 
or at the final hearing thereof, or afterwards, make such order regarding the support, care, custody, 
education, and control of the children of the marriage as may be just and in accordance with the 
natural rights of the parents and the best interest of the children."). 
124 In re Luke, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1412, 1424 (Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to address the idea of 
associational rights in a constitutional sense, foreseeing a conflict between parental due process 
rights over siblings; "our decision is a narrow one and we express no opinion regarding the relative 
importance of sibling relationships and the right to parent."); see also William Wesley Patton, The 
Status of Siblings' Rights: A View Into the New Millennium, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. I, 38 (2001) 
(concluding in part that "courts have seldom agreed to address the issue [of sibling's associational 
rights]"). Contra In re Marriage of Heath, 122 Cal. App. 4th 444, 449 (Ct. App. 2004) (stating that 
siblings have a "right to the society and companionship of their siblings."). 
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case." 125 Because child custody hearings can be predicated upon the 
statutory mandate of the "best interest" of the child, the resolution of 
constitutional issues is not necessary for such actions. 126 In contrast, 
civil gang injunctions targeting family relationships provide a situation 
where constitutional recognition of such issues can no longer be avoided. 
There is also some concern that by directly addressing these 
constitutional issues and recognizing additional familial rights, such as 
that between siblings or cousins, the courts will create a conflict between 
these newly recognized rights and the right of a parent to have custody 
over their children. 127 The fear is that such a conflict would put the 
courts in the awkward position of valuing these competing fundamental 
rights between parents, cousins, and siblings. 128 However, such fears are 
misplaced because such a conflict of interests can still be resolved under 
the "best interest" of the child standard in situations of child custody.129 
Moreover, as encouragement that such a constitutional interpretation is 
warranted, recent California decisions have indicated that there is a 
broader public policy for the state of California to acknowledge the 
rights of siblings to associate. l3O Because civil gang injunctions involve 
a scenario where there is no controlling statute to protect family 
members, broader family rights, such as those between siblings to 
associate, should and can now be directly addressed. 
The Supreme Court has stated "[o]ur decisions establish that the 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the 
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition." 131 In light of such language, the kind of private interests at 
stake in gang injunctions, like the ones faced by Mr. Buitrago and Mr. 
125 See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642 (1985) ("We avoid constitutional issues when 
resolution of such issues is not necessary for disposition of a case."). 
126 See In re Marriage of Heath, 122 Cal. App. 4th 444, 449-450 (Ct. App. 2004) (overturning 
trial court's decision to split up siblings, as it was not in the best interests of the children); see also In 
Re Luke, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1420-23 (basing the placement of siblings upon CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE §§ 358.1,16002 (West 2003)}. 
127 Francis McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status And Meaning of Paternal Rights, 
22 GA. L REV. 975, 1006 (l988) ("[W)henever there are conflicts between ... parents and their 
children ... framing all of the contending positions in terms of family rights will only confound any 
constitutional analysis and serve to negate any claims of rights."). 
128 Barbara Jones, Do Siblings Possess Constitutional Rights?, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1187, 
1215-20 (1993). 
129 Id. 
130 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 88 Cal. App.4th 808, 814 (Ct. App. 2001) ("At a 
minimum, the children have a right to the society and companionship of their siblings."); see also In 
re Marriage of Heath, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 450 ("[I)t is the policy of this state that siblings should 
be allowed to grow up together .... "). 
131 Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
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Iraheta, are significant beyond what was considered in Iraheta. 132 Not 
only does the Iraheta court's analysis not address the private interests at 
stake in the proper context of a potential deprivation as demanded by 
both the Eldridge and Lassiter tests,133 but the court also does not 
address the deprivation of familial rights even though it was an issue 
before the court. 134 In viewing the family relationship, it is apparent that 
this is a deeply rooted and intimate interest that the Constitution protects 
from governmental interference. 135 Because family relationships are the 
kind of interests that the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed deserving of 
protection, the potential interference with family relationships should 
overcome the presumption against counsel. 136 Moreover, even if the 
threat to this interest is not enough to overcome the presumption against 
the right to counsel, it should at least result in a very strong showing 
under the private interests prong of the Eldridge test, which, coupled 
with a renewed analysis under the other two prongs of the test, should 
overcome the presumption against counsel. 137 
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST AND THE RISK OF AN ERRONEOUS 
DEPRlV ATION IN LIGHT OF F AMIL Y RELATIONSHIPS 
The need for the right to counsel is further strengthened with a 
reconsideration of the governmental interests and the risks of an 
erroneous decision involved in gang injunctions that threaten to interfere 
with family relationships. Analysis of the governmental interests 
I32 The word "family" appears only once in the opinion, when the court states: "the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's interferences with ... family relationships." 
Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1509 (Cl. App. 1999). The words "brother," 
"twin" and "sibling" do not appear anywhere in the opinion. 
133 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319,340 (1976). 
134 The Iraheta court does say that the "Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's 
interferences with ... family relationships." Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509. However, it does not 
address whether Mr. Iraheta has such a threatened relationship. 
135 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 ("[T]he institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history."); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997) ("[F]amily relationships. " 
involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime."). 
136 See In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251 (Cl. App. 1983) (finding a right to counsel because 
severance of the parent-child relationship amounts to a taking of liberty). Contra Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (finding that "many of the rights and liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any 
and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected ... "). 
137 This comment is not proposing that civil gang injunctions should not be able to target 
family members. Family members do commit crimes together. When family members do commit 
crimes together and share in a criminal relationship - such as gang membership - that relationship 
should be subject to the same constraints as any other criminal relationship. 
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involved reveals that the government has a general interest in refraining 
from interference with the family whenever possible. 138 Moreover, even 
when such interference with the family is warranted, the government 
nevertheless has a very strong interest in assuring that such interference 
is not wrongful. 139 Because wrongful interference can best be avoided by 
the appointment of counsel, its use is warranted. 
Further, analysis of the risk of an erroneous decision as 
conceptualized by the Iraheta court will reveal the following: 1) civil 
gang injunctions that interfere with family relationships affect the kinds 
"private affairs" that warrant a redistribution of resources to appoint 
counsel; and 2) the solution the lraheta court envisions to deal with 
complex litigation is itself complex, inefficient, and unfair. 
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS 
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that when dealing with matters 
of the family, it "must examine carefully the importance of the 
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served 
by the challenged regulation.,,14o Thus far, such language has been 
viewed in the context of understanding the familial relationship as a 
private interest. 141 However, implicit within such language is also the 
notion that the government itself must value the familial interest at 
stake. 142 That is, because the Constitution provides protections to the 
family from government interference,143 and the government is bound by 
the Constitution,144 so then must the government have some interest in 
refraining from interfering with the family. 145 
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has also stated "[o]f 
138 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. 
139 1d. 
140 1d. A distinction can be made from this quote, however, as it was concerned with "choices 
concerning family living arrangements," not family associational rights. 
141 "A host of cases ... have consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter.'" /d. (quoting Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944». 
142 If the court must examine "the importance of the governmental interests advanced" and 
determine whether that interest is worth the disruption of the family, some governmental interests 
must be less than the importance of the family. Thus, a family free from governmental regulation is a 
governmental interest. 
143 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has long 
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620 (1984). 
144 U.S. Const. art. VI, § I, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land."). 
145 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. 
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course, the family is not beyond regulation.,,146 The Supreme Court has 
found, for example, that in "[a]cting to guard the general interest" the 
state may interfere with a parent's right to control the actions of their 
children in such matters as child labor and school attendance. 147 
Similarly, if family members are fellow gang members, then the state 
may also have justification for acting in the general interest to stop their 
criminal activities, for "[t]o hold that the liberty of... peaceful, 
industrious residents. . . must be forfeited to preserve the illusion of 
freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community as a 
whole is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the 
whole of its sense.,,148 
Thus, in situations where a conflict has arisen between the 
government's duty to refrain from interference with the family and its 
desire to impose a regulation upon the family, the U.S. Supreme Court's 
statement that it must "examine carefully the importance of the 
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served 
by the challenged regulation" takes on a new meaning: how to balance 
these competing interests?149 In trying to ascertain how to balance these 
interests, an increasingly important question for the government is 
whether those family members targeted by a civil gang injunction are 
actually gang members. If they are, then the hope of bringing order to a 
community facing violence and intimidation in its streets by preventing 
those family members from meeting together may justify interference 
with a family relationship. 150 However, if they are not gang members, 
146 Id. 
147 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding an aunt could not employ her 
minor niece to sell magazines despite any religious imperative to do so); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. 
Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325-326 (1913) (finding that a prohibition of children under 16 years 
from employment in hazardous occupations does not amount to a taking of liberty or property 
without due process of law); State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (Ind. 1901) (finding that prosecution 
of a parent for refusal to comply with state statute requiring compulsory education for minor was 
proper). 
148 People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1125 (1997); State v. Gaynor, 197 A. 360, 
361 (1938) (finding that the 1934 "Gangster Act" was a valid use of legislative authority since public 
policy demands that organized groups that "wage war" upon society be abolished). Contra Houston 
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471-72 (1967) (finding that the First Amendment invalidates a statute 
forbidding verbal criticism of officers: "We are ... mindful that the preservation of liberty depends 
in part upon the maintenance of social order ... [but] a certain amount of expressive disorder not 
only is inevitable in a society committed to individual freedom, but must itself be protected if that 
freedom would survive."). 
149 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. 
150 West Virginia v. U.S., 479 U.S. 305, 312 (1987) ("[W]hile courts must show 'solicitude 
for state interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property arrangements,' these 
interests may be overridden to avoid injury to "clear and substantial interests of the National 
Government.") (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966». The term "may" is used 
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then not only is the government working counter to its own interest in 
protecting the family, but the government is at the same time wasting 
resources in bringing and enforcing a suit that stands no chance to hinder 
gang activity.151 
"[O]ur adversary system presupposes [that] accurate and just results 
are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed 
interests.,,152 Indigent defendants who, like Mr. Buitrago, do not have a 
GED, stand little chance of successfully defending themselves against 
such a suit on their own. 153 Accordingly, a suit for an injunction could 
likely succeed in prohibiting family members from associating with one 
another whether or not they share a criminal relationship.154 Thus, 
because the Constitution makes the family the government's interest, and 
the government has an interest in not wasting legal resources against 
those who are not gang members, there is a strong governmental interest 
that counsel be provided to family members who are threatened by a civil 
gang injunction. 155 
in this context because it is not conclusive that civil gang injunctions work. See Cheryl L. Maxson 
It's Getting Crazy Out There: Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL'y 577, (2005). 
151 "What possible interest can the Government have in preventing members ofa family from 
dining as they choose? It is simply none of the Government's business." Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 
635,645 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (opining that there is no government interest in defining 
"household" for purposes of food stamp allotment because of interference with the family). It is 
interesting to note, in reference to this quote, that by imposing a civil gang injunction on family 
members the state will actually be prohibiting them from dining "as they choose," since enjoined 
family members would not be able to dine together in public. See also Stutson v. United States, 516 
U.S. 193, 197 (\996) (recognizing that "[j]udicial efficiency ... [is an) important value"). 
152 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,28 (\981); County of Orange v. Dabs, 29 
Cal. App. 4th 999, 1004 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding "appointed counsel is necessary to assure a 'level 
playing field.' This is particularly so in the unique situation where the state has elected to represent 
one private citizen against another."). 
IS3 In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251,263 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An uneducated indigent can 
easily become overwhelmed by such a proceeding without the assistance of counsel."); Opposition 
to Application for OSC, at 14, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. 
Sept. 5, 2007). 
154 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22,31 (\979) ("A judgment rendered in this manner [without 
counsel) is not only unfair, it is unreliable."). 
155 For a similarly formulated argument th~t views the private interest at stake as being a kind 
of governmental interest in order to find a right to counsel, see Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 33. In Salas, the 
court noted "the state has no legitimate interest incorrectly ascribing parentage and imposing the 
obligations of fatherhood on someone other than the child's actual father." Id. Also, because this 
governmental interest is premised upon litigation not reaching the truth of the matter, this 
governmental interest is then also dependent upon the risk of an erroneous decision. In 
understanding that the risk of an erroneous decision and the personal interests at stake come together 
at a nexus, which is the government's interest, only then can one also appreciate the danger in trying 
to fully isolate anyone prong of the Eldridge test. Indeed, the Iraheta court in considering the 
argument that "the state has no interest in erroneously branding a person as a gang member" 
attempts such an isolation of each interest. Specifically, the Iraheta court stated that "[p)etitioners, 
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B. THE RISKS OF AN ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION 
These concerns surrounding the personal and governmental interests 
at stake are increased by the risk of an erroneous decision in a civil gang 
injunction case. However, the Iraheta court specifically weighed such a 
risk of error and found it to be of minimal weight. 156 The Iraheta court 
considered two arguments as to the risk of an erroneous decision: the 
imbalance of resources and the complexity of the issues involved. 157 The 
court rejected both of these arguments, explaining an imbalance of 
resources is simply a "fact of life,,158 and the complexity required to 
appoint counsel is the need for experts, a need the court did not find in 
Iraheta. 159 However, careful examination of these arguments reveals just 
how great the risk of an erroneous decision is. 160 
1. The Imbalance of Resources 
The Iraheta court initially acknowledged that Mr. Iraheta was 
opposed by the "full resources of the state," a phrase taken from Salas v. 
Cortez, a case in which the court found a right to appointed counsel in a 
civil setting. 161 However, the Iraheta court did not attribute much 
strength to this argument and instead relied on the dissent in Salas, which 
stated: "It is an undeniable fact of life that in many civil suits the parties 
are unequally matched in terms of legal representation .... ,,162 The 
Iraheta court then went on to cite a distinction made in Clark v. County 
however, confuse Lassiter's second factor (the government's interest) with Lassiter's third factor 
(the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions)." Iraheta v. Superior Court, 70 
Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1511 (Ct. App. 1999). In attempting to artificially isolate these interests where 
they are necessarily intertwined, the Iraheta court failed to analyze their weight properly. 
156 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514 ("This is not a complex legal issue."). 
157 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1512-14; see also Petition for Review at 18-21, lraheta v. 
Superior Court, No. S078658 (Cal. Mar. 31, 1999), 1999 WL 33746242. 
158 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513 (quoting Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 37 (1979) 
(Richardson, J., dissenting». 
159 1d. at 1514. 
160 On the other hand, the lraheta court's determination that imbalance of resources is not a 
"decisive factor" is an appropriate distinction to make, as the courts "must balance these elements 
against one another." See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981). However, this 
language seems to echo earlier language in the opinion when the court stated that "[t]he possibility 
that [the] defendant [in Salas] would suffer the loss of his physical liberty, while a factor, was not a 
determinative factor." Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1510. While this is true, the finding of multiple 
factors that are "not determinative" seems to indicate that, even without the consideration of family 
interests, civil gang injunctions generally have some of the qualities that call for the appointment of 
counsel. 
161 Salas v Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 30 (1979). 
162 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513. 
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of Orange: "clearly, imbalance [of resources] cannot be a decisive 
factor, as it is the rare case where the state does not have greater 
resources than a private party in any sort of litigation.,,163 This line of 
argument does not seem to disagree with the proposition that those 
targeted by civil gang injunctions are at a distinct disadvantage and that 
this may result in an erroneous decision, but rather contends that life is 
tough, many litigants are often at a distinct disadvantage, and the court's 
job is not to "equalize all such legal conflicts."I64 
The Iraheta court went on to say that of all of those who are at a 
distinct disadvantage, it is the "private affair" targeted by the government 
that deserves the protections of counsel in a civil case, and since civil 
gang injunctions operate under a public nuisance claim, the action 
concerns the public at large, not private parties. 165 However, if the court 
had addressed the issue that Mr. Iraheta was being enjoined from seeing 
his twin brother, it would most likely have found such a "private affair" 
as being threatened. The Iraheta court itself stated that there is a "private 
affair between a mother and the man she named as the father of her 
child" and that "the Fourteenth Amendment protects against a State's 
interferences with ... family relationships ... [as this area] represent[s] a 
'realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. ",166 
Thus, in raising the issue of family relationships as being threatened by 
civil gang injunctions, the Iraheta court's previous statement that the 
appointment of counsel is reserved for private affairs supports the 
proposition that counsel should in fact have been appointed. 167 
2. The Complexity of the Litigation 
The Iraheta court's discussion of why civil gang injunctions do not 
163 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513; Clark v. County of Orange, 62 Cal. App. 4th 576, 591 
(CI. App. 1998). 
164 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513. 
165 1d. 
166 lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1509 (quoting Armendariz v. Penman (9th Cir. 1996).) 
167 What counts as a "private affair," however, could be distinguished under a narrower 
reading of County a/Orange v. Dabbs, 29 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1004 (CI. App. 1994) (fmding that the 
need for the appointment of counsel "is particularly so in the unique situation where the state has 
elected to represent one private citizen against another."). Using this language, one can argue that 
there is only interference with a "private affair" when the state is actually acting upon the interest of 
a single party, rather than the "entire community," as a nuisance does under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 
(West 2008). If this is the case, then the fact that those targeted by a civil gang injunction are also 
family members does not matter, since this would not change that the injunction is being brought on 
behalf of the entire community. However, such a reading runs counter to intuition, and even the 
lraheta court held that there is a "private affair between a mother and the man she named as the 
father of her child." lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1513. 
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rise to the level of complexity that demands the appointment of counsel 
is perhaps the most unsettling part of the opinion. The Iraheta court 
dismisses the idea that the issues at stake in a civil gang injunction are as 
complex as the issues presented in Salas, a case that included DNA and 
blood group testing. 168 The court begins by noticing "[t]he only issue 
petitioners have identified that cannot be raised by way of subsequent 
collateral attack (if and when petitioners violate the preliminary 
injunction) is whether petitioners are gang members.,,169 The Iraheta 
court then points out that by using the tool of collateral attack a 
defendant has the option of violating the court order, receiving court-
appointed counsel in the ensuing criminal case, and then collaterally 
attacking all of the issues that were litigated in the civil case with the 
court-appointed counsel. 170 Thus, the court concludes that there is no 
need to consider court-appointed counsel to deal with the complexity of 
the original action because a defendant has a way to get court-appointed 
counsel to re-litigate these civil issues. 171 
The court's suggestion that a defendant may violate a court order so 
that he or she may obtain criminal counsel to re-litigate the civil issues 
involved in a gang injunction presents issues of efficiency and fairness. 
Issues of efficiency exist because the court is essentially acknowledging 
that court-appointed counsel can, and in proper circumstances should, 
litigate the issues that arise in civil gang injunction actions. l72 However, 
the path the court has laid out for a defendant to obtain appointed counsel 
168 Iraheta,70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514. 
169 Id. A "collateral attack" is defined as "[aJ n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other 
than a direct appeal; esp., an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in 
which the ground of the proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is 
ineffective ... A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack.-Also termed 
indirect attack." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
170 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514. 
171 In order to mount a collateral attack upon the injunction, the Iraheta court suggested that a 
defendant could rely on CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 533 and 904.1 (West 1999). Iraheta, 70 Cal. 
App. 4th at 1514 n.6. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 533 (West 1999) reads as follows: "In any action, the 
court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing 
that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining 
order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted 
has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modi fication or dissolution of the 
injunction or temporary restraining order." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 1999) reads as 
follows: "(a) An appeal, other than in a limited civil case, is to the court of appeal. An appeal, other 
than in a limited civil case, may be taken from any of the following ... (6) From an order granting or 
dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction." 
172 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1514 ("[TJo argue that the risk of an erroneous decision is 
more likely due to the complexity of the facts is also misplaced. The only issue petitioners have 
identified that cannot be raised by way of subsequent collateral attack (if and when petitioners 
violate the preliminary injunction) is whether petitioners are gang members."). 
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utilizes many steps that could simply be eliminated. To demand that an 
indigent defendant go to a civil trial, represent himself, fail to understand 
the complex issues involved in the case, lose, have an injunction leveled 
against him, violate the injunction, face prosecution, get appointed 
counsel, and then re-litigate these complex issues that the court has 
already been over, creates significant costs to the system that could and 
should be avoided. 173 
The issue of fairness arises when the court demands that a litigant 
put himself or herself in the awkward position of facing criminal liability 
to effectively challenge a civil suit. If the Iraheta court is going to rely 
on such possible crirninalliability for the full and fair adjudication of the 
issues, then the court should consider the appointment of counsel as 
though it were a criminal case. As a result, the court's earlier statement 
that there is no deprivation of personal liberty because the possibility of 
incarceration is not "directly and immediately implicated" loses its 
validity. 174 Because Iraheta sweeps these issues of complexity to the 
side by demanding that litigants use a procedural run-around, the court 
fails to properly address the complexity of the issues at stake. 175 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In reconsidering civil gang injunctions and the appointment of 
counsel in the new light of family relationships, analysis of the Lassiter 
presumption and the weighing of each Eldridge factor brings forth a call 
for counsel. However, in the wake of the Iraheta decision, individuals 
like Mr. Buitrago are not ordinarily provided counsel and normally face a 
173 See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996) (recognizing that "[j]udicial 
efficiency ... [is an) important value"). Moreover, "[t)he process of researching and obtaining gang 
injunctions is expensive, incurring between $400,000 and $500,000 in legal costs." Matthew 
Werdeger, Enjoining the Constitution, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 442 (1999). Earlier the Iraheta court 
stated "the People have a legitimate interest in avoiding the expense of appointed counsel and the 
cost of the lengthened proceedings his or her presence may cause," and "the financial ramifications 
could well be extraordinary." lraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1511-12. By engaging the complex issues 
in a civil gang injunction case via this inefficient process of collateral attack, the court has implicitly 
relaxed its concern. While the justice system would not be paying for appointed counsel in the first 
proceeding, it would nonetheless be paying for the city attorney, judge, and court staff. In addition, 
in the second proceeding, the justice system would then have to pay for the city attorney, judge, 
court staff and the public defender. 
174 Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 1510. 
175 The Court's solution to complexity is itself very complex; it "ignores the fact that since 
petitioners are not lawyers, they would not even know where to begin to engage in these options. 
Moreover, if petitioners violated the injunction, and were then appointed attorneys in the criminal 
case, it is unlikely that a successful appeal, modification, or dissolution of the injunction by the 
criminal defense lawyers would in any way affect the criminal contempt prosecution." Petition for 
Review at 18 n.5, lraheta v. Superior Court, No. S078658, 1999 WL 33746242 (Cal. Mar. 31, 1999). 
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difficult situation. Unable to afford an attorney, they would have to hope 
for pro bono representation or face the dangerous task of self-
representation. 176 If Mr. Buitrago did represent himself, it is doubtful 
that he, a man who is in the process of trying to get his GED, would be 
able to mount a reasonable - let alone formidable - defense against the 
application for injunction. 177 Perhaps certain facts would come to light, 
for instance, that his alleged gang related moniker, "Tone," is a family 
nickname given to him by his uncle when he was four l78 and that he and 
his cousin are respectively referred to as "Fat Tone" and "Little Tone.,,179 
It may also come to light that Mr. Buitrago has no criminal record. 18o On 
the other hand, more complex legal arguments pointing to the balance of 
the harm imposed by the injunction, or the possibility that any of the 
provisions of the injunction are void for vagueness, would most likely be 
out of reach for Mr. Buitrago. In the absence of all of these defensive 
arguments, a civil gang injunction might easily be imposed on a non-
gang member. 181 
However, because Mr. Buitrago lives in San Francisco, he found 
himself with a bit of luck. The charter of the San Francisco Public 
Defender's Office includes a mandate to protect not only those who are 
facing prosecution, but also those facing a "danger of criminal 
176 19A CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 109 (2001): "The following is a suggested admonition 
to a defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation: I. Self-representation 
is almost always unwise and the defendant may conduct a defense to his or her own detriment; 2. 
Defendant will ... get no help from the judge; 3. The prosecution will be represented by experienced 
professional counsel who will have the advantage of skill, training, education, experience and 
ability; and 4. Defendant will have no special library privileges, will receive no extra time for 
preparation and will have no staff of investigators at his or her beck and call." 
177 In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 263 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An uneducated indigent can 
easily become overwhelmed by such a proceeding without the assistance of counsel."). Also in 
cases where counsel is provided, it has been noted that "[a]lthough a defendant need not himself 
have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-
representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation .... " Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (finding that although a state 
may not force an attorney upon a criminal defendant, it is almost always a good idea not to represent 
oneself); Opposition to Application for OSC, at 14, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492 (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
178 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at 2-3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
179 Mr. Buitrago is to this day still "very heavy"; he is 5' II" tall and weighs 320 pounds. 
Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A 2-3, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-464492, (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
180 Opposition to Application for OSC, Exhibit A at I, People v. Norteno, No. CGC 07-
464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). 
181 In re Jay R .• 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 263 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An uneducated indigent can 
easily become overwhelmed by such a proceeding without the assistance of counsel."). 
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prosecution.,,182 Violation of the civil gang injunction subjects the 
individual to criminal prosecution and punishment of imprisonment for 
up to six months in county jail.I83 Accordingly, the San Francisco Public 
Defender's Office may, and did, intervene on Mr. Buitrago's behalf. 184 
In fact, it is likely due to the intervention of the San Francisco Public 
Defender's Office that a San Francisco judge ruled on October 12,2007, 
that there was not "clear and convincing evidence" that Antonio Buitrago 
is an active gang member, and thus he is not subject to the effects of this 
particular civil gang injunction. 185 
So, Mr. Buitrago is in luck; he may still see his cousin in public. In 
California, however, being lucky is the exception rather than the rule; in 
other counties in California, the Public Defender's Office does not have 
such a broad mandate and cannot intervene. 186 Without such a broad 
mandate those who face the loss of a familial relationship and are unable 
to hire counsel face a bleak situation. 187 They face lawsuits that seek to 
stop criminal actions but afford none of the protections of criminal 
law. 188 They face actions that threaten to interfere with important, 
182 San Francisco Charter § 6.104 ("The Public Defender shall, upon the request of an accused 
who is financially unable to employ counsel, or upon order of the Court, defend or give counselor 
advice to any person charged with the commission of a crime or in danger of criminal prosecution."). 
183 CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (2008); Opposition to Application for OSC, at I, People v. 
Norteno, No. cac 07-464492 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2007). Because imprisonment is 
brought within the realm of the possible, Mr. Buitrago is "in danger" of criminal liability and the San 
Francisco Public Defender may intervene. 
184 Opposition to Application for OSC, People v. Norteno, No. cac 07-464492 (San 
Francisco Super. Ct. June 21, 2007). 
185 Demian Bulwa, Judge Gives Norteiios Strict Restrictions at http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-
biniarticle.cgi?-f=/c/a/2007/10/16/BANNSQ9SI.DTL (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) (SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 2007). It should be pointed out, as noted by San Francisco City Attorney 
Dennis Herrera, that "[t]he court didn't say (Buitrago) wasn't a gang member, but that there wasn't 
clear and convincing evidence that he was." [d. 
186 For example, Los Angeles Charter article VI, section 23, allows only for appointment 
when one is charged or has a reasonable appeal to make from a conviction. The section reads: 
"Upon request by the defendant or upon order of the court, the Public Defender shall defend, without 
expense to them, all persons who are not financially able to employ counsel and who are charged, in 
the Super. Ct., with the commission of any contempt, misdemeanor, felony or other offense. He 
shall also, upon request, give counsel and advice to such person in and about any charge against 
them upon which he is conducting the defense, and he shall prosecute all appeals to a higher court or 
courts, of any person who has been convicted upon any such charge, where, in his opinion, such 
appeal will, or might reasonably be expected to, result in a reversal or modification of the judgment 
of conviction." 
187 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 31 (1979) ("A judgment rendered in this manner [without 
counsel] is not only unfair, it is unreliable."). 
188 For the standards used in a civil gang injunction, see People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 
4th. 1236, (Ct. App. 2001) (finding there is no right to a jury trial in a civil gang injunction action, 
and the standard of clear and convincing evidence is used in the determination of such actions); see 
also People v. Iraheta, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1500, 1514-1515 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding no right to 
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legitimate, and established constitutional rights to associate with their 
families as they choose.1 89 This dangerous combination warrants the 
appointment of counsel to ensure due process under the Constitution. 
ALEXANDER JONEl 
counsel in a civil gang injunction action). In contrast, for the standards used in criminal cases, see 
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right [to a 
trial] by an impartial jury."); Clark v. Ariz., 548 U.S. 735, 738 (2006) ("[A] defendant is innocent 
unless and until the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense 
charged."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (finding a right to counsel in criminal 
actions). 
189 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) . 
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